Saturday, June 13, 2009

Need help with Rand quote

ITOE 61: "Genuine utterances about the nothing must always remain unusual. It cannot be made common. It dissolves when it is placed in the cheap acid of mere logical acumen." Heidegger

Which Heidegger work, at least? Rand provided no citation.

(Update: The Heidegger work is called "An Introduction to Metaphysics.)

The Kantian Ayn Rand

Ayn Rand said in ITOE p. 255 -
You know the best example I could give—perhaps this will help. If you brought a dog or a cat into this room, it would be aware of everything that we see here. It would also see the room, the objects, and the people. What it would never be able to grasp is, "I am conscious of this room," although that fact is inherent in its perception.

Then what is the difference between that idea and Kant's idea of apperception?

But all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness which precedes all special experience, namely, the consciousness of myself as original apperception. It is therefore absolutely necessary that in my knowledge all consciousness should belong to a single consciousness, that of myself. CPR A118.

Thursday, June 11, 2009

A note about the Randzapper Blog

The Randzapper is a blog devoted to attacking Randroids around the WWW, particular usenet. And while my blog does not exist to attack other blogs, I would just like to point out that the blog's author has not properly identified who is and is not an Objectivist (much less a Randroid). For example, this post has misidentified old-time usenet hound Bob Kolker as an Objectivist. And in this latest post there is a reference to Randroids with Aspberger's syndrome, a disorder which Kolker admitted to having. (And in the first post I mentioned the author has also misidentified the number of posts authored by Kolker at 49,835, but that is highly unlikely and in fact those statistics generators count cross-postings as unique. That factor can cause them to really add up fast.)

Apart from that, the Randzapper comes recommended for its entertainment value only.

Monday, June 8, 2009

Progress

I have made some recent progress in deepening my understanding of Kant's Critique (and as a corollary, furthering my understanding of where Rand went terribly wrong in her Kant criticism). If it is the case that all attributes (properties) of an existent are at least theoretical (or as Kant would say, possible) intuitions, then it is no longer the case that, as per Objectivism, a thing is its attributes, implying that all things must have attributes. Yet it is only the case that everything man has observed thus far has attributes. It is not as if to say that the idea of a thing lacking attributes is a self-contradiction simply because it is not an object of intuition.

Rand wrote: "Two fundamental attributes are involved in every state, aspect or function of man's consciousness: content and action—the content of awareness, and the action of consciousness in regard to that content. (ITOE 2, 29-30)

I would certainly agree with that. However, it is not necessarily the case that every existent can serve as a possible content, as in this case, a possible sensible content.

To be a possible experience, an existent must have attributes, even granted senses acute enough to apprehend them or instruments powerful enough to detect them. But that is only a problem for knowledge, it does not indicate anything about what actually lies "out there." To assume that every existent has attributes based on man's sensory apparatus is a mistake. It is not, in other words, a self-contradiction to say that an existent has no attributes. And it is not equivalent to the proposition "an existent doesn't exist."

Objectivists by implication seek to limit, not experience (as with Kant), but existence itself through their assumption that all things have attributes based on man's sensory apparatus. (Objectivists are therefore subjectivists.) There is, on the contrary, not only the possibility of existents lacking attributes, but also of existents possessing infinite attributes - that is to say, attributes so vast that it would require a God-like sensory apparatus to grasp them.

Thus, by showing us the limits of possible experience, Kant has made "space" for the possible existence of objects which can never possibly be apprehended through the senses. That is to say, he has made room for the existence of noumena.

Someone reading this blog may by now be drooling for some examples of such objects. These have already been revealed in Kant's Critique, although not in the manner I have portrayed here. But Kant, early on in the Aesthetic portion of the Critique, gave the example of a "right" as a thing-in-itself (viz., not a possible appearance). A "right" has no sensible attributes, but it qualifies not so much as a thing-in-itself (Kant was wrong) but as a noumenon. (Kant's 'error' can be excused by the fact that he had not yet argued for the noumenon at that point, and anyway the thing-in-itself is a kind of intellectual precursor for the idea of noumena to come later.)

So it's not as weird as it sounds. Such entities as "right" have "practical" existence in Kant's view, they have no sensible attributes, and they are "sensible" to the extent that we bring them into practice in the realm of appearances (of existents possessing sensible attributes), and thus observe them indirectly.

There are other entities mentioned above having "practical" existence as noumena brought down to the level of appearances. Those are the existents having infinite attributes, the entities "God," "Freedom," and "Immortality," Kant's three Regulatory Ideas of reason.

Monday, June 1, 2009

midnight musings...

I have been hanging around at author Greg Nyquist's AynRandContraHumanNature blog lately looking for something to do online. Finding something to do offline never seems to be a problem, it is the online world which is seriously lacking. A blog is not that much different from usenet, just less busy and more controlled. However, it seems that at least one basic law still applies: the shorter the post, the angrier the poster, because less thought is required to be angry. Or to put it another way, it takes fewer intellectual "muscles" to be angry.

For those of my few readers who don't know me, I am a one-time Randroid, and I was Leonard Peikoff's "number one fan" up to around 1998. I already knew, at that time, that Rand and co. were wrong about Kant (and about most other philosophers), but it took some more time for me to realize that they were just plain wrong about almost everything.

I knew they were wrong about Kant from my first-hand reading and studying of the Critique of Pure Reason. At first, in true Randroid fashion, I took it for granted that Immanuel Kant was, as Rand stated somewhere, "the most evil man in mankind's history." But since I sometimes enjoy abstruse writings I decided to check out his Critique for myself. There at the local library I found some confirmation of Rand's and Peikoff's criticism of Kant, but for the most part I had not a clue what Kant was saying. I did find, however, that the NKS translation I was reading was very soothing in an aesthetic sense. It was a pleasant, albeit incomprehensible, read.

This last is not a factor to take lightly. It was, indeed, the reason for my buying my own copy of the Critique, in an effort not only to understand it but to enjoy it. I found that making an effort to understand the book detracted from my enjoyment it, and that the adage "analysis kills" was certainly true from my own personal perspective.

However, I don't believe that enjoyment is necessary to understanding, and I eventually persevered in reading and basically understanding the Critique. It was not easy, and 25 years later I am still only making progress, the end of which is seemingly set to eternity.

It is really quite difficult to make the leap into the transcendental, somewhat like trying to imagine structures in 4 dimensions. The mind naturally finds it easier to stay in the usual 3 dimensional world, and it takes constant practice in order to prevent one's mind from lapsing into the lesser, more common-sense view of the world held from childhood. It is easy to see, therefore, why some people prefer Rand over Kant, that is, they prefer the world of their childhood via the feeling of escapist nostalgia over playing with model trains which seems more grown up when reading about "real" trains and "serious" grown-up moral/political issues in a grown-up fantasy novel like Atlas Shrugged).

I have found over the years, and thousands of conversations with Randroids, that it is difficult for them to make these first steps to true adulthood if they believe that this requires being weaned away from Rand's teat, and imagine the terror of being led from Rand to Kant's waiting arms. But Kant doesn't want them, that is only their delusion. Kant wants them to grow up, not merely to crawl from one master to another. Kant is only showing them the way to themselves, individually speaking.

The first baby step to intellectual individuation is to understand that nothing outside the mind is to be taken for granted. That is not skepticism, that is the reality of seeing how science has advanced down through the centuries, tossing aside assumptions, forming new paradigm shifts, erasing prejudices about the world.

The first step in Kant's view is to start with the basics which is the world around you, and then cut it in half: into that which is experienceable, and that which is not. He does this by taking the findings of previous philosophers with regard to the senses to their ultimate extreme. Everything we perceive is via the modification of the senses. When light-waves reach the eyes, they become color. When vibrations in the air reach the ears, they become sound. When something presses against the skin, it becomes pressure. This is all a function of the senses, to translate that which comes from outside the senses into a form which is perceivable by the mind.

But this view assumes that some of the perceived elements arrive in the mind unmodified, which is dualistic and even idealistic. So Kant takes this argument a step further. There is not just the senses, there is also the sensibility, one of the faculties of the mind. The sensibility carries along with it two a priori functions: space and time. In this way Kant finished the task begun centuries before. Not only are sound, touch, taste, texture, pressure, color, and so on, reduced to subjective appearances, but so also are space - extendedness - and time - simultaneity and duration. Furthermore, space and time do not mentally arise as some modified version of an external reality, as do color, sound, etc. They do not originate outside of us at all, but are completely a priori. All properties of an object are therefore subjective.

One would think, therefore, that the goal of the empirical idealist (Berkeley) is now complete, and that Kant has only completed his task. But one would therefore be sadly mistaken. For it is only by assuming that space and time are outside us that everything is reduced to the subjective, not only the properties of an object which reach the senses, but also the object itself. For Kant has not, even through his Critique of space and time, reduced the object itself to subjectivity, but only its appearance for us, that is, its mental representation which is a sum-total of its properties as modifications of the senses, and the spatial/temporal which lend the appearance its form.

Recall that the view before Kant's time had the thing-in-itself in space and time external to the mind, with its various properties as modifications of the senses, a view which literally splits the thing into two ontological divisions. Yet it is this view which reduced the thing to illusion. What matters here is that its spatial/temporal properties are only properties of the mind (not the senses, but the sensibility), and that now, when I refer to it, I am no longer referring to anything beyond the appearance of the thing.

Kant has various arguments supporting the ideality of space. A left- and a right-handed glove are, mathematically speaking, completely isomorphic; and yet, one glove cannot fit inside the other. Its left- or right-handedness is therefore an appearance, but not an illusion, of the mind. Kant makes a similar argument regarding the reflection of a hand or an ear in a mirror. He also talked about the moon appearing larger on the horizon, and how this effect cannot be traced back to any external physical cause such as refraction of its light in the atmosphere, as with the stick appearing bent by its light refracting through water. This last is a true illusion, but the moon's large appearance on the horizon, or small appearance at its zenith, is nothing more than the effect of its relationship to us in space. It is an effect of the mind.

Kant uses this observation to great advantage. It is no longer permissible to talk about the thing-in-itself, that is, the thing out of all relationship to the mind. If you want to pretend you are God, in that relying on your sensing mind is irrelevant and unnecessary, then you are free to do so, but don't call the result of your ponderings either philosophy or science. His focus is therefore no longer on the problem of intrinsic being or any such fallacy, but on the mental faculties themselves and how they act upon its own content, every possible object in experience having been reduced to its appearance for us which is basically just content for the mind to work over. That which cannot become experience is not held under consideration here. The ancient Problem of Universals, discussed on ARCHN, and also by the Randroids, is now a dead non-issue.


More Randian Hilarity

Even apart from the fact that Kant's theory of the "categories'' as the source of man's concepts was a preposterous invention...

ITOE p.31

Now wait a minute. Weren't the categories Aristotle's invention? Indeeeedy they were...


Saturday, May 30, 2009

Reply to a Randroid

On Tue, 05 May 2009 19:28:10 -0700, Fred Weiss
wrote:

>On May 5, 7:43 pm, MalKantent wrote:
>> On Tue, 05 May 2009 15:54:42 -0700, Fred Weiss
>
>> >> >Except that we don't know what "that which exists" is which is
>> >> >"impinging upon the senses".
>>
>> >> Yes we do, or, as Kant stated, it would be to have an appearance
>> >> without anything to appear.
>>
>> >That is not the same thing as knowing what it is. In fact, once again,
>> >he EXPLICITLY denies that we can know what it is.
>>
>> There is no explicit denial of knowing anything empirical.
>
>Namely "appearances". That's no more or less than any crackpot
>Idealist would also claim.

The only EXPLICIT denial is found in your Kant interpretations. I
quote you Kant's EXPLICIT denials concerning the charge that he is a
Subjectivist, charges that were leveled against him soon after the
publication of the Critique, but you evade them.

>Look, you keep repeating this over and over and over again as if it
>addresses the question. I'm losing my patience with you and your
>blatant dishonesty.
>
>> Of course he knows what it is.
>
>What is the "it" which he claims to know? Appearances and appearances
>only. Certainly *not* what the appearance is *of*. That is the
>unknowable "thing-in-itself"
>
>Once again you are ducking and dodging.

Simply start with your own experience and distinguish within that
experience the knower (yourself) from that which is known (the object
of knowledge). This is an obvious distinction to be made. The objects
of perception are not created in the mind, that is your false
interpretation; all that the knower gives to experience, according to
Kant, are space, time, and the categories (unity, causality, etc.).
The knower does NOT give the object in experience, that is given by
the object itself. Nor is there any Rand-like theory that sensory data
are put together as percepts in the brain - a theory, by the way,
which is hardly proven if at all although Rand tried to lend it the
aura of scientific credibility back in the 1960s.

>Furthermore, the simple fact is that at the drop of a hat you'll do a
>somersault and eagerly embrace Kant's (and your) subjectivism,

Kant's subjectivism does not involve the object, but only the forms
given by the knower to experience.

>denying
>the very thing which you seem to be affirming here - and blathering
>about the moon on the horizon or color, etc. etc. Then what is it that
>we supposedly know? Especially given Kant's explicit claim that we
>*impose* space and time on reality. Somehow that is supposedly going
>to save him from subjectivism.

Kant believed that his theory of "imposing" space and time on
appearances saved all of us from subjectivism. He made many, many
statements to the effect that the only means by which even the most
extreme realist can be saved from subjectivism is through his doctrine
of space and time. He believed that the subjectivist begins with the
notion that space and time are "out there," as some kind of subsisting
or inhering universal substances. This, he believed, was the manner in
which the subjectivist crushed out of existence all certainty. Kant
had no desire to be some kind of super-subjectivist, but to re-orient
space and time in such a way that certainty could be saved, by
locating them in the mind of the knower.

Anyway, it is not as if space and time are "imposed" on appearances,
because that would be an activity and Kant denies activity to the
faculty of sensibility, granting it only receptivity. Appearances are
simply spatial and temporal, those are the manner in which appearances
are received.

>> You are silly. Kant has denied only a certain variety of knowledge, that of the Platonic variety.
>
>What are you babbling about? What has that got to do with anything?

I am "babbling" about the fact that Kant made very explicit time and
time again that he was out to eradicate what you call "subjectivism"
which I consider a Platonic tradition in philosophy. Plato held that
the only true knowledge was knowledge of the realm of Forms beyond
experience, of which objective reality is only its mere shadow. To the
contrary, Kant held that the Forms are not beyond experience, they
are part and parcel with experience. It is the Platonic belief that
the Forms are beyond experience which led to notion that the
senses bring only illusion; Kant held that by bringing the Forms back
to experience where they belong that all such illusion could be
eradicated and objective reality established as knowable and not
illusory.

Saturday, May 2, 2009

Another Objectivist Superstition Regarding Kant

"Immanuel Kant was a defender of religious notions against empirical science."

First of all, Immanuel Kant was a scientist, he wrote about the nature of the solar system and nebular phenomena and made progress in understanding them.

With regard to Kant's criticisms of science, "scientific empiricism" would be better termed "materialism." Materialism is a theory which tends to stifle any idea of autonomous freedom of the will and thus kills morality dead, as dead as a rock. Materialism is a philosophy which treats humans as things.

On the other hand, Kant was also against what he called "spiritism," a theory which neglects the material side of human nature and considers only the spiritual side. For Kant, man is both a material and spiritual being, but he says nothing with regard to the spirit or soul separating from the material body at death. It is rather a synthesis of mind and body here, both elements being given a fair shake within his philosophy.

This is seen in his CI of Humanity, the metaphysical integration which is THE VERY KEY to healing the ancient mind-body dichotomy is found in his practical moral imperative. To repeat, "we should never act in such a way that we treat Humanity, whether in ourselves or in others,
as a means only but always as an end in itself." I would emphasize the word ONLY, because this means that humanity (or yourself) can be treated as a (material) thing, but not ONLY as a thing but also as an end in itself.

What this says is that while we cannot PROVE that man is a synthesis of mind and body (the question remains an unanswerable antinomy for metaphysicians), we can, however, through following the CI of Humanity, actualize the mind-body synthesis in our everyday practical
living by treating the humanity in ourselves and others as both a thing and as an end in itself. In this way, while the mind-body dispute is not resolved theoretically, it is answerable practically
(the practical being traditionally synonymous with the moral). Thus the key to resolving ancient metaphysical disputes lies in the moral realm of reasoning and not in the theoretical. The theoretical side of Kant's philosophy found in the CPR is aimed toward this practical solution.

The CI of Humanity is an effective way of synthesizing (integrating) the mind-body aspects of persons within a single formula. As body, they are usable as things, but NEVER ONLY as things, but also as a thing, a body, with a mind, with reason and will, and thus, always as ends in themselves.

It is this CI of Humanity which has turned many philosophers' minds toward Kant and away from merely materialistic outlooks, of which Objectivism could debatably be deemed only one of many.

The Objectivist canard about Duty

Duty, it is claimed, can arise only in a social context, and is closely related to the concept of altruism. Objectivist egoism therefore rejects "duty" as evil, particularly Kant's version which is an alleged all-out war on the individual.

That is just a Randian straw-man argument against duty, it does not take into account Kant's actual arguments in its support.

Duty is, generally speaking, that activity which requires an effort of free-will to perform, this says nothing about society. But more specifically, Kant would have all duties oriented in the direction of the CI which he considered a product of reasoning and not of society,
external authority, or subjective whims and inclinations.

Indeed, if duty to the CI were socially oriented as they claim, then that would render Kantian morality heteronomous, which means dependent on and enslaved to empirical factors. It is very basic to the understanding of this topic that Kantian morality is not heteronomous, it is a theory of moral autonomy, which means, in my view, freedom from enslavement to the empirical (whims, authorities, and society).

It is my view that Objectivism holds to a heteronomous view of the will which enslaves the will and reason of its followers to the natural, empirical inclination toward happiness - and implicitly, to Ayn Rand's will to follow her philosophy and way of life through the power of the writings she left behind. The will of the Randroid is not autonomous, that is why they are described as Randroids. They may assert that it is only the power of her reasoning which is so influential. But this alleged reasoning is supported by a great many attacks on her alleged "opponents," real or imaginary. Such attacks are not reasonable or philosophical, they only serve as emotional rhetorical devices aimed at making her alleged absolutes seem beyond reproach.

So how could Kant hold to a view of the will as autonomous and yet hold to a form of deontology at the same time? He doesn't. I deny that his morals was duty-centered at all, they were CI-centered. The CI is based upon reason, and it is by your autonomous will that you choose
to follow it by doing your duty to reason vs. following inclinations or "whim."

It is the Randroid, on the other hand, who has relinquished his autonomous will in favor of doing his duty to the will of Rand.

Against the Altruist Interpretation of Kant's morality

One Objectivist argument has it that defending Kant against the interpretation of his morality as eee-villl altruism is not good enough. "Pure Kantianism" (whatever that is) is the extreme of eeeee-villl. Regular, everyday, run-of-the-mill altruism cannot even compare to the variation allegedly propounded by Immanuel Kant. So-called "mundane" altruism is only a "minor vice" in contrast with the pure Kantian eee-villl form which goes far, far beyond it.

Such an argument, however, is irrelevant in that there can be, in the Objectivist view, no morality more e-vil than altruism in whatever form. Even if it were the case the Kant completely disconnected morality from real-life concerns and values, he is still an alleged altruist, only he would be (if that were the case) one who is more absolutist in his arguing toward it. This is allegedly not any wishy-washy self-sacrifice Kant is calling for, but all-out, no-holds-barred self-sacrifice (plenty of hyphens included, of course).

Still, altruism is altruism, whether in weak, moderate, or extreme and undiluted form. And in fact, Kantian morality is none of this anyway.

Kant was an Enlightenment supporter of political freedom. Nothing in his metaphysics or morals contradicts this support. It is not logically possible to promote free-will in his morals, basing the existence of this free-will on his metaphysics, and then to promote moral duty and political dictatorship as a result. It is far more likely that his explicit support of political freedom derived from a rational metaphysical basis.

Objectivists will retort that Kant was a supporter of duty over free-will. But it is nothing more than to say that duty - doing the right thing - often requires an effort of will. For example, when you have to get up early in the morning after working a 12-hour shift the day before, you
just don't feel like going back to work for yet another round. But it is something you have to do despite your feelings ("inclinations") against doing it, it requires an effort of will along with an idea of whether following reason (duty) or whim (inclination) is the right thing to do.

For another example, an alcoholic begins to see the damage that drinking is doing to his life (perhaps he has "hit bottom", and so one day he makes a heroic effort to put that beer back in the refrigerator without opening it; the next day, he opens it but, with another effort
of will, he takes the next step and drains the entire thing down the sink.

That is what Kant means when he says the will is free, the will is not in the service of any inclinations, not even the inclination to be happy, even if this happiness is based on the most rational, or better, prudent principles in the world. The will is not a slave to the natural inclination to be happy either. If happiness results as a matter of course, then that is the "icing" on the moral "cake," it is not denounced in Kantian moral theory at all. And Kant would argue
that following the CI is the only rational way to support the attainment of happiness at least indirectly through doing one's duty to morality, synonymous with doing a service to oneself and not as an altruist serving only others above and beyond the self.

Regarding this last, the CI of humanity says that "we should never act in such a way that we treat Humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself." This means that you do not treat even yourself as a thing to be used for other
ends, at least, not as a sole principle, but that you are an end in itself, or at least the humanity within you which is the essence of your being.

Where Rand states that man's life qua man is an end in itself, Kant states that Humanity, whether in yourself or others, is a moral end in itself. This connection has been made many times before, but many other elements of their respective moralities differ so substantially
and in so many regards that most people will agree that the similarity ends here. I can only say that they were also in agreement regarding the issue of "whim," although Kant called the same concept by the term "inclination."

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

analytic-synthetic

"An axiomatic concept is the identification of a primary fact of
reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or
broken into component parts."

And yet Peikoff railed against the so-called analytic-synthetic dichotomy.

What's ironic is the Objectivist definition of "axiom" - in which you will find
the very idea of analysis itself, and even the word "analyzed." It is
just a short step for them to understand that putting the "broken"
component parts back together again involves nothing more than a
synthesis of those parts.

Saturday, May 31, 2008

Kant and Geometry

Here is an example of why the analytic-synthetic distinction is so important
to the history of modern thought.

http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm
"Although it is often claimed, as by the great French mathematician
Poincaré, that the existence of non-Euclidean geometry refutes Kant's
philosophy of geometry, in fact Kant's view of the nature of the
axioms of geometry as synthetic a priori propositions means that Kant
could have predicted the existence of non-Euclidean geometry. This
should be obvious given any clear understanding of the meaning of
'synthetic'."

We need a clear understanding of this meaning. In pursuit of this, the
article on Kant quotes Hume:

"In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume made a distinction
about how subject and predicate could be related:

All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be
divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of
Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and
Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either
intuitively or demonstratively certain [note: these are Locke's
categories]. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square
of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between
these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty,
expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind
are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence
on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were
a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid
would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are
not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their
truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The
contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can
never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the
same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.
That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a
proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation,
that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to
demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would
imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the
mind. [Enquiries, Selby-Bigge edition, Oxford, 1902, 1972, pp.25-26]"

This is the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions
implied by Hume, and finally elucidated by Kant. It is a division,
yes, but not a division of TRUTHS as Hume claimed in the quote above.
Because Hume's example of the sun rising tomorrow does not pack the
same punch as a truth such as Peikoff's "ice floats on water." We can
always dispute what will happen in the future, relegating it to the
realm of probability. But that ice floats on water (not will float, or
has floated, or is floating on water) is an indisputable truth, as
indisputable as "ice is a solid form of water."

And yet, I term the former synthetic, and the latter, analytic,
despite the indisputable nature of both propositions. Indisputability,
or necessity, has nothing to do with it. Rather, indisputability is
relegated to the realm of the a priori, with its necessary and
universal truths. And so, as indisputable, the two truths in question
are both a priori: the former synthetic a priori, and the latter
analytic a priori. Kant has spelled this all out in detail so there
should be no question about it.

The distinction depends on how the two propositions are constructed,
that is, how subject and object are linked in a particular a priori
statement of truth. They are, no doubt, linked with necessity, this
has never been disputed, but they are linked only as necessary a
priori. There is no such thing as a posteriori necessity, only a
posteriori contingency (e.g., the proposition "there could have been
more or less than 50 states in the US"). Contingency brings with it an
element of doubt, it doesn't pack the same punch, and we do not doubt
that ice floats on water any more than we doubt that ice is a solid
form of water.

But "floating" cannot be considered a concept constituent of "ice."
"Solidity" can. That ice is made of water can also. And so to say that
a proposition is analytical is only to say that it elucidates the
constituent elements of a concept, the sine qua nons of any concept
without which the concept would not be.

The danger is always to avoid converting this into an ontological or
metaphysical discussion. I am not talking about all those things the
actual ice can do, or how it is affected by circumstance or "context"
due to the various natures or identities involved. I can only see this
as the source of many synthetic propositions, some a priori and some
a posteriori. But the consideration here is only with that necessity
bound up with types of propositions, not with the necessity bound up
with identities in nature. And so this discussion is really nothing
more than the eludication of rules of method: namely, Kant's synthetic
and analytic methods.

Critique boils down to methodology, primarily, the method by which
philosophy and science are to be constructed, and how their various
and sundry propositions are to be construed. It is important to note
that for Kant the introduction to his Critique did not invoke
philosophy, but science and mathematics. That is, those basic truths
upon which his Critique of philosophy were formed were borrowed from
the truths of science and mathematics, not so much in their content as
in their form, particularly, how the form of their propositions came
to form truths. Borrowing from this, Kant determined that philosophy
itself also utilizes such forms, only historically not as precisely
formulated, mainly because the propositions of philosophy had not been
as intuitive (meaning, they are quite abstracted from the evidence and
the rule of the senses, as is the nature of philosophy).

Not that it was only philosophy that required Kant's help. Science and
mathematics can also benefit from having the form of their truths
elucidated in order to reduce the amount of confusion that is always
involved in any attempt at garnering abstract truths.

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

The analytic-synthetic dichotomy

[Slightly edited]

Leonard Peikoff obtained fame within the
Objectivist community with his article 'The Analytic-Synthetic
Dichotomy.' Even though Peikoff named Kant as the namer of
this "dichotomy," somehow he becomes associated with all its
20th-century ills, many of which come from A.J. Ayer.

But the "dichotomy," which is really only a distinction, is easy to see
by mathematical example. Arithmetically contained in the concept
of the number 4 (staying with the natural numbers) is the idea of a
combination of numbers, such as 1+1+1+1, or 2+2, or 3+1. The example
most commonly taken from these is 2+2=4.

2+2 is more than just a combination, it is a synthesis (or
integration) of two numbers which equals 4. But it is analytical to
the concept of the number 4 that it consists of adding 2 and 2. This
is just a matter of going backwards (right to left) or forwards (left
to right) in the equation 2+2=4. To go backwards is to divide the
number 4 into two elements by analysis. To go forwards is to
synthesize these two elements back into the number 4.

This formulation is easily applied to the concept 'furniture' in
Rand's example at ITOE 22. Notice that Rand has done part of the work
for us already, by reference to the "constituent concepts" (sometimes
also called "constituent units" or "constituent particulars") of the
concept. Those constituents are nothing more than the various items
of furniture: tables, chairs, beds, armoires, etc. The concept
"furniture" is a product of their synthesis into that concept.
Precisely how this takes place - by differentiation and integration -
is irrelevant in this context, just as the exact mathematical process
was irrelevant to the previous example, although "integration" is
certainly synonymous with "synthesis." And by the same token, a
"constituent concept" or "unit" is the result of analyzing a "wider"
concept into its components.

At one point Rand supported my contention that integration and
synthesis are the same process: "The uniting involved is not a mere
sum, but an integration, i.e., a blending of the units into a single,
new mental entity which is used thereafter as a single unit of thought
(but which can be broken into its component units whenever required)."
(ITOE, 9)

So you have, within Rand's own epistemological context, the very ideas
of synthesis and analysis which are then later attacked by Peikoff, et
al.

The reason 2+2=4 was thought, before Kant's time, analytical or even
tautological was probably because the answer, 4, was taken for granted,
and so 2+2=4 was held equivalent to 4=4. But this ignores the process of
synthesis (or integration) by which the answer 4 was obtained which is
why Kant, in the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, suggested
using much larger numbers on the left side of the equation.

Sunday, April 20, 2008

"What turned you off of Objectivism?"

The title of this post came from a question asked on the "AynRandContraHumanNature" blog. I know there are basically two answers, one coming from the ex-Objectivist being asked and the other coming from his ex-friends whose personal individualities are still enmeshed in the movement and the aura of Ayn Rand's beliefs. Those who have left the movement will relate various reasons for the break. But those still in the movement think they know the real reason: there is some deep flaw in the ex-Objectivist's premises so profound that not even Objectivism can root it out.

What amazing mind-readers.

I know for me it started slowly, over time. The first awareness I have of breaking away (although I didn't see it coming at that time) occurred when curiosity drove me to find a wider historical context for Objectivism; but it didn't seem to fit in anywhere, it resisted labeling beyond itself. And so the system (such as it is) kind of just hung in mid-air attached to nothing, originating nowhere. This was intellectually dissatisfying, and so Objectivism slowly turned from the focus of my life to an anomaly to be studied from afar, like an insect.

The process was aided along by my eventual realization that Rand and Peikoff were light-years away from an understanding of Immanuel Kant, "the most evil man in mankind's history." Their critique of Critique is so deeply flawed that there is no hope for it. Even Kant's harshest critics do a better job of critiquing than both Rand and Peikoff combined, whose Kant sound-bites were carefully hand-selected and aimed at an audience of converts willing to swallow it all hook, line, and sinker; or simply to those who despise grandiloquent systems of thought anyway, having so recently had them rammed down their throats in college.

Ayn Rand, a philosopher who wrote and spoke about Reality and A is A, had little idea about reality around her. Her break with reality became more evident with the passage of time, culminating in Atlas Shrugged, a novel which is ingenius yet utterly ridiculous, sane in its utter insanity, and gigantic in inverse proportion to the philosophy it attempts to put forth. In this work Rand portrayed a world ripped out of the romantic 19th century and flung into the 20th, consisting of a combination of dazzling, newfangled technology bordering on and then acquiring the status of science fiction, and old-fashioned chutzpah in which politicians sound like 1920s gangsters and leaders of industry behave more like fantasy adventurers of yore. And although Rand admits that this is all dramatization designed to pique the interest of potential fans, and that she never expected anyone to actually recite the oath of egoism ("I swear, by my life and my love of it..."), one begins to wonder how much she really understood that to be the case. Because, in her later essays, characterizations of real people, politicians and such, sadly begin to resemble characterizations from one of her fantasy dramas.

Even more sad is the plight of those whose egos, once their own, are still caught up in the philosophy of a dead cult-leader, having sacrificed their minds and souls to a goddess who most likely did not originally intend to take on such status, but when she did, played it to the hilt and then some.

Tuesday, April 8, 2008

Excerpted from Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd edition
appendix:

"Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
to say that.
AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
valid distinction.
We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
perceive all attributes by our means of perception - including
length?"

Well, yes Miss Rand, we certainly do perceive all attributes by our
means of perception. (Tautology.) But that's not what Prof. C asked
about. His premise was that bitterness is not an attribute of the
object.

Rand's rhetorical question is just another example of an Objectivist
trying to make something out of an empty tautology.

Saturday, March 22, 2008

Greg Nyquist's response

Greg Nyquist wrote:
'That's right, I'm touching on the issue of conflict of interests. The Randian assertion is that, provided that these interests are "rational," they won't conflict. The trouble is, Rand doesn't explain how to distinguish, in practical terms, a rational from a non-rational interest. And since ultimately, all interests are groundless, it is difficult to see how the term rational can be used, in regards to interests, in a way that does not reduce itself, ultimately, to a term of approbation. A "rational" interest, then, is simply an interest that Rand and her followers approve of (and think others should approve of).'

This can be broken up into two distinct arguments.

1. It is a complaint against Ayn Rand for failing to explain how to distinguish, in practical terms, a rational from a non-rational interest.

2. since ultimately, all interests are groundless, it is difficult to see how the term rational can be used, in regards to interests, in a way that does not reduce itself, ultimately, to a term of approbation.

I thought the first point was rather easy to answer. Two men are seeking a job, they are pursuing practical rational interests. Or, one man is seeking a job, another man is seeking public welfare, the second man is seeking, in practical terms, a non-rational interest.

The second point is slightly harder to answer insofar as it constitutes an assertion which is really a petitio. Asserting that all interests are groundless means they are not grounded in either reason or instinct, free-will or nature, duty or inclination. However, Greg has admitted that there is a such a ground in the approbation of the interest to which it is reduced.

Tuesday, March 18, 2008

identity of the "Profs." in the ITOE appendix

Prof. A - Harry Binswanger
Prof. B - Allan Gotthelf
Prof. C - Nick Bykovitz
Prof. D - Ralph Nelson
Prof. E - Leonard Peikoff
Prof. F - George Walsh
Prof. G - Fred Weiss
Prof. H - Mike Berliner
Prof. I - Gary Lockman
Prof. J - John Allen
Prof. K - Al Jakira
Prof. L - Tony Plasil
Prof. M - Larry Gould

Monday, March 17, 2008

For Rand, perception of color and length are only in the subject

This is for you non-believing Randroids I have conversed with who
refuse to accept the idea I've put forth here that color doesn't exist
outside of perception.

The context is a question about the primary-secondary quality
"dichotomy."

AR:
"We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
perceive all attributes by our means of perception - including length?
Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
arbitrary or subjective." (ITOE2, Appendix, 279)

("Processing"?... as in "I am HAL, pleased to meet you Commander
Data"? Are humans thinking machines? What would be the purpose in
nature evolving a thinking machine...)

First, I would like to get out of the way Rand's comment about
perception not being arbitrary or subjective. Fine. Whatever. It's
never been relevant to any of my points anyway. I am simply interested
in what *is*, not whether it is objective, arbitrary, or subjective.
Those labels are all just ideological blather, used in place of a chip
on one's shoulders in daring some arbitrary, subjectivist skeptic, who
doesn't even exist, to come knock it off. Nothing works like inventing
enemies in order to make one's position seem stronger, even
unbeatable.

But it is not necessary to work on Objectivism via ideological
conflict, that is the illusion she wanted to portray. It is necessary
merely to analyze Rand's writings for factual consistency, accuracy,
or just plain good old-fashioned internal logic (e.g., is it
self-contradictory?). And internal logic is not objective, it is not
anything ontological; neither is it "non-objective" because it
abstracts from all (objective, subjective, arbitrary) content of an
argument and judges only its formal presentation, that is, the formal
manner in which it is presented.

So with regard to the material quoted from the Appendix to ITOE, I
want to highlight the following for examination:

"...don't we perceive all attributes by our means of perception -
including length? Everything we perceive is the result of our
processing..."

The question boils down to asking, "but don't we perceive by means
of perception?" I know, you're thinking that the context is qualities,
or attributes, so I should not have dropped the word "attributes." But
is it relevant?

Not at all. Rand is talking past her interlocutor in her answer.
Because he (known only as "prof. c") specified only qualities such
as color, not attributes such as length. So Rand's example of length
is not relevant to the question, and this question doesn't all boil
down simply to the tautology regarding perception of that which is
perceived, qualities and attributes being held up as equals and not
distinguishable as either primary or secondary. Both are merely the
result of processed sense-data.

In this way, Rand reduced the question to her formula, A is A. And as
a result, implied that, just as color is not in the object, therefore
neither is length. This is why it was necessary for Rand to keep to
the example of color which is a quality and avoid reducing every such
example to perception.

a bit more on Rand and class-formation

In my first post I examined class-formation as it related to concept-formation and the ancient problem of universals, in which I stated that Rand did not bother or failed to examine classification theory. There is more detail to that theory than I really need to get into here, I just want to point out that while Rand did not examine class-formation, she did bring it up early on in ITOE.

'A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members. (Two stones are two units; so are two square feet of ground, if regarded as distinct parts of a continuous stretch of ground.) Note that the concept "unit" involves an act of consciousness (a selective focus, a certain way of regarding things), but that it is not an arbitrary creation of consciousness: it is a method of identification or classification according to the attributes which a consciousness observes in reality. This method permits any number of classifications and cross-classifications: one may classify things according to their shape or color or weight or size or atomic structure; but the criterion of classification is not invented, it is perceived in reality. Thus the concept "unit" is a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology: units do not exist qua units, what exists are things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships.' (ITOE2, 6-7; emphasis mine.)

There are a number of great points to be made about this theory, sloppy as it is. It takes for granted knowledge of similarity pages before Rand actually goes into the subject in chapter 2.
But as always, it takes for granted concepts already formed, such as "stone" and "ground." And so we are left with the circular notion of classifying units on the basis of their concepts in order to eventually form (the same) concepts out of these units.

It appears that her idea of what classification involves is right on: "one may classify things according to their shape or color or weight or size or atomic structure." So true.

The "act of consciousness" mentioned is "a method of identification or classification according to the attributes which a consciousness observes in reality." What method that is, she doesn't say. Unit-formation?

Strangely enough, when forming a unit it seems that one is really forming a class out of existents: but aren't existents units? Or is "existent" just the general idea of a thing -- which is still a unit?

She used the term "criterion" to describe the attributes found to be similar, but they are not criteria of anything in the proper sense of the word. So it is difficult to know what she means in that passage, except to say that an existent is not an arbitrary creation of the mind. Well, of course it isn't. There's nothing like being able to state a simple fact and making it sound important as hell.

Then there is this odd statement: 'Thus the concept "unit" is a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology,' as if metaphysics had anything to do with this. But the context indicates that Rand is juxtaposing mind (epistemology) and reality (metaphysics). It sounds really cool but in reality it is meaningless jargon.

Finally, Rand leaves us with the following word-salad: 'units do not exist qua units, what exists are things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships.'

I see. Units do not exist, what exists are things, but units are things.

And what is this about "existing relationships"? Has Rand yet explained how knowledge of existing relationships is acquired? Has she determined whether or not these relationships are "metaphysical" or "epistemological," that is, is the very concept of a "relationship" another idea like a "unit," that doesn't exist, because what exists are things, but relationships are things...um, viewed in certain existing relationships. This is circular.

But then, I've been known to point out in the past that ITOE is a concrete example of the petitio principii in action.

So what is it about classification (or class-formation) that lends so much credence to Rand's argument here? We all know what she's talking about, we take it for granted as a given, it seems to be a scientifically established point. But it is never properly analyzed by Rand.

Friday, March 14, 2008

On Ayn Rand's failure to examine "class-formation"

References to ITOE2 refer to Ayn Rand's "Introduction
to Objectivist Epistemology," second edition.

Let me start off by defining what I mean by a "class."

A class is "a collection of things sharing a common attribute."
http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

An example of this would be the class of red books. Notice that I have
not defined a concept here, only a class. It's distinguishing
characteristic is redness, which is a universal, but not essential to
forming a special concept of red books. (There is also the universal
'bookness' characterizing the books, but let's just discuss redness
for now.)

In order to designate a concept it was necessary for Rand to designate
a special form of class, known as a concept, which integrates two or
more instances by means of certain properties known as essentials.
These essentials are defined as distinguishing characteristics of an
entity, distinguished "from the other entities belonging to the same
genus." (ITOE2, 41)

(I'll ignore the fact that her theory of concept-formation by
essentials illustrates a logical fallacy known as the 'fallacy of
difference,' which states that distinguishing characteristics are not
necessarily essentials, as rationality is not necessarily essential to
manness merely because it is a characteristic used to distinguish
man from animals. Or perhaps let's just say rationality is only
essential to forming the concept, it is not necessarily essential in
the metaphysical sense.)

In class theory it is not necessary to denote two or more instances in
forming the class. A class can consist of one member or even zero, for
example, if someone painted an elephant pink, and it was the only one
in the world, the only member of its class; or if there were no pink
elephants in existence, the class would be empty.

No attribute is essential to forming a class, what matters is that the
uniting characteristic is a universal, that is, the attribute is shared
by all members of the class such that it helps to define the class.
In that case, the attribute is a property, belonging to individual
entities as members of the class, becomes known as a universal.
A universal is held in common by all members of a class, even if the
class consists of only one member, or none.

ITOE consists of some kind of answer to the problem of universals,
accomplished, in Rand's own words, "by presenting my theory of
concepts" (Ibid, 3). And in her mind, universals are equated by Rand
with concepts or abstractions (1), reducing the metaphysical
problem to a problem of concepts.

So as a result of Rand neglecting to examine the issue of classes upon
which is genetically dependent the issue of concepts, she did not
thoroughly examine the issue of universals connected with it, assuming
the problem of universals is only an epistemological one (which it is
not; it is primarily metaphysical at its root). And if a particular
property can be universal to a class consisting of only one member,
then it follows that a concept can be formed from a class consisting
of only one member.

There is an example of such a class found in ITOE2, and that is the
concept or axiom "existence." It seems to violate Rand's rules of
concept-formation, particularly that of the conceptual common
denominator, "The characteristic(s) reducible to a unit of
measurement, by means of which man differentiates two or more
existents from other existents possessing it." (14) In this case there
is only one existent, existence itself. (For those of you who believe
that "existence" is only a concept, Rand believed that concepts are
also existents, indeed, even concrete mental entities.[156])

At one time I was led to believe that the axiomatic concept 'existence'
was no concept at all, that is, by Rand's own rules of concept-formation
(which she rationalized as a "special" exception [58-59]). However,
I now realize that the problem lies with her theory of concept-formation,
most basically, her neglect in examining the wider genus determining the
very notion of a concept, and that is, the class theory behind it.

Rand defined "concept" in one place as "a mental integration of
two or more units which are isolated according to a specific
characteristic(s) and united by a specific definition."(9) However,
"a mental integration" is not specific enough, as "set" or "class"
also constitute mental integrations of material serving as members
distinguished by properties held in common, that is, universals.
("Class" and "set" are often used interchangeably, but "set" is more
of a mathematical expression to which I don't want this analysis to
be limited.)

How does this issue apply to the problem of universals? This problem
does not rely on the issue of class or even concept, but how man has
knowledge of 'redness' despite the fact that, in reality, there is no
particular color that he can distinguish as epitomizing "redness." Or
perhaps many things can serve this function; however, all of them will
vary in their particular shade of red. Thus the question is not "where
is the manness in men" (2), but "How does man's knowledge of manness
arise?" Or, "How does man's knowledge of universals arise from amidst
the great variety of particulars around him?" This is a question of
epistemology, and it is not answered by any theory of
concept-formation.

Geometry can help answer this question, or at least, pose the question
in a more useful way. For example, there are no straight lines in
reality, none at any rate which correspond to man's concept of a
straight line. A straight line is a mental construct, an ideal
concept, used for creating or defining approximations of straight
lines in reality based in utility. Every straight line in reality
instantiates the universal "straightness," without however
substantiating it. There is no substantiating a universal because
there is no substance, no entity in reality equal to this mental
entity, only approximations to it. There is, to put it in terms of
Rand's question (2), straightness in a straight entity, but only
insofar as a mind puts it there. The universal therefore lies a priori
to the judgment of that which is considered straight.

And so, as Aristotle indicated in his Metaphysics II §8, Being and
Unity, the two highest universals, are as one in the same entity, only
I say not in the ontological sense. The being, the whatness, the
universal, is a product of the mind, the unity is universals to any
particular individual in reality (a unit). The product of their
synthesis is variety in experience, without which, in Aristotle's
words, "there is much difficulty in seeing how there will be anything
else besides these, - I mean, how things will be more than one in
number." For if Being and Unity, two universals, existed in
themselves, as properties of an entity, then it would be impossible
to have the concepts of plurality, variety, or many-ness.

And so the properties we designate to individuals, when these
individuals are formed into classes, become universals, but are not
thereby granted existence outside a thinking being qua universals.
Induction only gives the material for creating the universal, but as
essential to its completion there must be concepts borrowed from
metaphysics, that is, metaphysical properties attributed to the
members of the class. For example, Being (Substance), Unity, and
Necessity. Metaphysical concepts grant objective truth to inductive
reasoning, and not merely relative truth.

This class of concepts was not derived from empirical reality, as if
we could somehow intuit its Platonic form, they are nevertheless
metaphysical as deriving from man's primary *form* of cognition which
is rational. Just as man's metaphysical nature demands that he find
straightness in that which is not, as a formal standard to serve
practical building purposes, so his metaphysical form of reasoning
demands that he produce concepts of things from the vastness and
variety of nature, utilizing concepts of his own devising a priori.