a bit more on Rand and class-formation

In my first post I examined class-formation as it related to concept-formation and the ancient problem of universals, in which I stated that Rand did not bother or failed to examine classification theory. There is more detail to that theory than I really need to get into here, I just want to point out that while Rand did not examine class-formation, she did bring it up early on in ITOE.

'A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members. (Two stones are two units; so are two square feet of ground, if regarded as distinct parts of a continuous stretch of ground.) Note that the concept "unit" involves an act of consciousness (a selective focus, a certain way of regarding things), but that it is not an arbitrary creation of consciousness: it is a method of identification or classification according to the attributes which a consciousness observes in reality. This method permits any number of classifications and cross-classifications: one may classify things according to their shape or color or weight or size or atomic structure; but the criterion of classification is not invented, it is perceived in reality. Thus the concept "unit" is a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology: units do not exist qua units, what exists are things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships.' (ITOE2, 6-7; emphasis mine.)

There are a number of great points to be made about this theory, sloppy as it is. It takes for granted knowledge of similarity pages before Rand actually goes into the subject in chapter 2.
But as always, it takes for granted concepts already formed, such as "stone" and "ground." And so we are left with the circular notion of classifying units on the basis of their concepts in order to eventually form (the same) concepts out of these units.

It appears that her idea of what classification involves is right on: "one may classify things according to their shape or color or weight or size or atomic structure." So true.

The "act of consciousness" mentioned is "a method of identification or classification according to the attributes which a consciousness observes in reality." What method that is, she doesn't say. Unit-formation?

Strangely enough, when forming a unit it seems that one is really forming a class out of existents: but aren't existents units? Or is "existent" just the general idea of a thing -- which is still a unit?

She used the term "criterion" to describe the attributes found to be similar, but they are not criteria of anything in the proper sense of the word. So it is difficult to know what she means in that passage, except to say that an existent is not an arbitrary creation of the mind. Well, of course it isn't. There's nothing like being able to state a simple fact and making it sound important as hell.

Then there is this odd statement: 'Thus the concept "unit" is a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology,' as if metaphysics had anything to do with this. But the context indicates that Rand is juxtaposing mind (epistemology) and reality (metaphysics). It sounds really cool but in reality it is meaningless jargon.

Finally, Rand leaves us with the following word-salad: 'units do not exist qua units, what exists are things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships.'

I see. Units do not exist, what exists are things, but units are things.

And what is this about "existing relationships"? Has Rand yet explained how knowledge of existing relationships is acquired? Has she determined whether or not these relationships are "metaphysical" or "epistemological," that is, is the very concept of a "relationship" another idea like a "unit," that doesn't exist, because what exists are things, but relationships are things...um, viewed in certain existing relationships. This is circular.

But then, I've been known to point out in the past that ITOE is a concrete example of the petitio principii in action.

So what is it about classification (or class-formation) that lends so much credence to Rand's argument here? We all know what she's talking about, we take it for granted as a given, it seems to be a scientifically established point. But it is never properly analyzed by Rand.