I have made some recent progress in deepening my understanding of Kant's Critique (and as a corollary, furthering my understanding of where Rand went terribly wrong in her Kant criticism). If it is the case that all attributes (properties) of an existent are at least theoretical (or as Kant would say, possible) intuitions, then it is no longer the case that, as per Objectivism, a thing is its attributes, implying that all things must have attributes. Yet it is only the case that everything man has observed thus far has attributes. It is not as if to say that the idea of a thing lacking attributes is a self-contradiction simply because it is not an object of intuition.
Rand wrote: "Two fundamental attributes are involved in every state, aspect or function of man's consciousness: content and action—the content of awareness, and the action of consciousness in regard to that content. (ITOE 2, 29-30)
I would certainly agree with that. However, it is not necessarily the case that every existent can serve as a possible content, as in this case, a possible sensible content.
To be a possible experience, an existent must have attributes, even granted senses acute enough to apprehend them or instruments powerful enough to detect them. But that is only a problem for knowledge, it does not indicate anything about what actually lies "out there." To assume that every existent has attributes based on man's sensory apparatus is a mistake. It is not, in other words, a self-contradiction to say that an existent has no attributes. And it is not equivalent to the proposition "an existent doesn't exist."
Objectivists by implication seek to limit, not experience (as with Kant), but existence itself through their assumption that all things have attributes based on man's sensory apparatus. (Objectivists are therefore subjectivists.) There is, on the contrary, not only the possibility of existents lacking attributes, but also of existents possessing infinite attributes - that is to say, attributes so vast that it would require a God-like sensory apparatus to grasp them.
Thus, by showing us the limits of possible experience, Kant has made "space" for the possible existence of objects which can never possibly be apprehended through the senses. That is to say, he has made room for the existence of noumena.
Someone reading this blog may by now be drooling for some examples of such objects. These have already been revealed in Kant's Critique, although not in the manner I have portrayed here. But Kant, early on in the Aesthetic portion of the Critique, gave the example of a "right" as a thing-in-itself (viz., not a possible appearance). A "right" has no sensible attributes, but it qualifies not so much as a thing-in-itself (Kant was wrong) but as a noumenon. (Kant's 'error' can be excused by the fact that he had not yet argued for the noumenon at that point, and anyway the thing-in-itself is a kind of intellectual precursor for the idea of noumena to come later.)
So it's not as weird as it sounds. Such entities as "right" have "practical" existence in Kant's view, they have no sensible attributes, and they are "sensible" to the extent that we bring them into practice in the realm of appearances (of existents possessing sensible attributes), and thus observe them indirectly.
There are other entities mentioned above having "practical" existence as noumena brought down to the level of appearances. Those are the existents having infinite attributes, the entities "God," "Freedom," and "Immortality," Kant's three Regulatory Ideas of reason.
Monday, June 8, 2009
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9 comments:
Wouldn't objectivists say that these things come into existence as the attributes become senseable to us?
Objectivists reason that it is MAN's existence that matters, and the only reality available to him is the one he can sense. Therefore, this is the only reality that matters.
Kant also argued that man's existence is what matters - indeed, "The highest purpose of Nature...is the development of all the capacities which can be achieved by mankind..." “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View”
- but also that this reality (the phenomenal) isn't the only one that matters. Kant found it necessary to postulate another intellectual or conceptual realm (the noumenal) in order to preserve moral reasoning from the deadening influence of materialism, and also, from mystics such as Swedenborg. (Kant was no mystic by any stretch of the imagination, and he even tended to favor various flavors of materialism in his pre-Critical years as a scientist.)
As for "Wouldn't objectivists say that these things come into existence as the attributes become senseable to us?" - I'm not sure what that means, but it sounds subjectivist and I don't think you meant it that way. All I'm saying is that the limitation of the senses to attributes within all possible sensory range (that is, anywhere between zero and infinity) does not thereby limit the possibility in itself of existents having infinite attributes (God) or zero attributes (e.g., "right"), without actually saying that God exists.
I fully grant the bare logical possibility that either God does or doesn't exist. But since I am not saying that He does exist, I cannot therefore fall victim to the argument that the burden of proof is on the claimant. I am only opening up the slightest conceptual possibility of God's existence defined as an existent bearing infinite attributes (omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.) and that is in no way a possible experience for us.
"I'm not sure what that means, but it sounds subjectivist and I don't think you meant it that way."
What I meant was that if we can't sense the attributes of something, then it doesn't exist. For an entity that we cannot sense to be brought into existence, it needs to start interact with our reality, e.g until God shows himself, he doesn't exist.
It's the same when something leaves the realm of man's existence, as when a person dies he ceases to exist, even if he goes to heaven, which we can't sense and therefore does not exist.
In that sense, the universe may contain as many entities as you like, but the only ones that exist are the ones we can sense (the phenomenal). Other entities simply does not enter our existence, even though they themselves exist in some other existence (their own, the noumenal).
In objectivism moral is determined by observation of the phenomenal, and specifically LIFE. The ethics and morality of life and for life is basically, "live and let live", and so objectivism reasons that only the phenomenal is relevant. the nouminal is irrelevant, and we don't need it for anything, not even morality. I agree.
I'm not arguing that God exists. I am only arguing for the bare intellectual possibility that God, or another realm of being containing entities such as God, exists. These entities, as you said, may not enter our existence (our universe) but they cannot rationally be said not to exist. They simply don't exist for us given all possible sensory limits (measuring somewhere between zero and infinity).
So when you say "they themselves exist in some other existence (their own, the noumenal)" you are really arguing for my position. It doesn't really matter where they possibly exist, on this Earth or in some Heaven, as long as they can be said to possibly exist somewhere.
But notice you are laying claim to an actual existence beyond the realm of the senses, while I am making the far less substantial claim of a mere possible existence. I certainly don't claim to have laid bare anything beyond a mere possibility. Given the limitations of the senses to this realm, all I can reasonably say is that this leaves the "door" open to the possibility of another realm, even though that "door" is merely intellectual.
"But notice you are laying claim to an actual existence beyond the realm of the senses, while I am making the far less substantial claim of a mere possible existence. I certainly don't claim to have laid bare anything beyond a mere possibility. Given the limitations of the senses to this realm, all I can reasonably say is that this leaves the "door" open to the possibility of another realm, even though that "door" is merely intellectual."
The door is as intellectual as Alice in wonderlands rabbit hole.
If something has attributes that we cannot sense, we can't even know IF they exist, but if they do they are as relevant as Peter Pan, and we can know as little about them as we can about never-never-land, we can only "know" what we imagine.
Anonymous,
This has to do with the old philosophical discussion over substances and attributes. The question concerns attributes "clinging" to substances, or if there can be substances without attributes, and whether or not substances really exist for attributes to cling to. And in the history of this much of it concerns that substance known as the "soul," as subsisting eternally, or locating it somewhere (is it spatial as well as temporal?), and whether it is even appropriate to speak of a "soul" regarding humans much less everything else alive or dead.
Kant attempted to keep such conversations alive, not by asserting the existence of anything like a soul (he actually denied us the ability to talk about it as a thing), but by relating it to the very need of reason to postulate such a substance in the first place. If there is a soul, then it is immortal, and immortality gives us reason to hope for a better future.
That is not Alice in Wonderland, that relates back to a basic human need to always quest after something better.
"This has to do with the old philosophical discussion over substances and attributes. The question concerns attributes "clinging" to substances, or if there can be substances without attributes, and whether or not substances really exist for attributes to cling to. And in the history of this much of it concerns that substance known as the "soul," as subsisting eternally, or locating it somewhere (is it spatial as well as temporal?), and whether it is even appropriate to speak of a "soul" regarding humans much less everything else alive or dead."
This brings us back to where we started, a philosophy where MAN'S existence is the only one that matters, even if there are entities outside his existance, whose attributes we cannot sense, must only concern itself with MAN'S life, and the things he needs to survive and prosper in the world.
All things belonging to the nouminal are thus irrelevant because man lives by reason, and reason depends on knowlegde, and there is no way to gain knowlegde of that which has no attributes.
"That is not Alice in Wonderland, that relates back to a basic human need to always quest after something better."
I agree, this is very important to all humans, we have the ability to project and forecast events, including our own death, and the question "what comes after" is as natural as "what's for dessert". It is important that we be able to change our own future for the better, as human beings we can know and understand what's for dinner and dessert, we can plan to save room for "dessert", a strategy practised by most kids, but these are real life events of which we have knowlegde. In regards to what comes after death, of which we have absolutely no information what so ever, there is nothing to base reason on, unless you count imagination as knowledge.
Regards,
nico :)
nico said...
This brings us back to where we started, a philosophy where MAN'S existence is the only one that matters, even if there are entities outside his existance, whose attributes we cannot sense, must only concern itself with MAN'S life, and the things he needs to survive and prosper in the world.
I absolutely agree that everything is related back to man's existence, entities "outside" his existence are considered only logical possibilities, that is, conceivables. And yet it is the merely conceivable, not empirical and sensible, that drives man onward. Historically, even before any ideas of Heaven or reincarnation, men sought immortality through their progeny or through being remembered historically. Julius Caesar sought immortality through beginning a line of Caesars to stretch into eternity. After his assassination he was granted deity status by the Roman Senate.
If man has a natural desire to live forever thus achieve immortality, then that is a real factor to be considered even if immortality doesn't exist except metaphorically. And somehow his ultimate happiness is bound up with this concept, thus forecasting (to borrow your term) an event beyond all possible reach of consciousness after death.
And so in Objectivist terms, man not only has the ability to plan his life long-range, he has the ability, and even the desire, to plan his life long-range and beyond. A great Randian hero may achieve immortality through the invention of a new motor. Ayn Rand achieves immortality through the invention of a philosophy carried on by others into an unlimited future.
Every Christian is selfish in that regard, that is, when you consider that personal salvation is the goal of their religion, and that the greatest evil would be to give one's place in Heaven over to another. The goal of every Christian is thus extremely selfish, even if other-worldly.
I don't think Ayn Rand herself believed in limits. Her faith in mankind was unlimited. This is nothing more than to say man has potential beyond the sensible world of knowledge and not to speak mystically at all. What you're never empirically aware of is the belief in the limitless potential to change the destiny of mankind, and that is why it is relegated to the realm of belief, that is, the noumenal realm. Ayn Rand was a visionary who saw far beyond the world around her, and I think this is one of the major attractions for her fans. It is only because people don't limit themselves to the empirical world that they find hope in Rand's philosophy or at least her novels.
One thing I have noticed is that Rand's essays don't have the same "feel" as her novels, particularly Atlas but also the more aesthetically inclined Fountainhead. I don't feel any greater ambition, or faith regarding mankind, when reading ITOE, although there is to a small extent the same luster shining forth. A visionary's vision does not shine as brightly in essays on theoretical problems of philosophy. The broader aspect of "greatness" is lacking because of the objectivity of the approach. Whereas aesthetics (e.g., novel writing) is mainly subjective in its appeal.
(To be continued...)
(continuing...)
The empirically unverifiable has no objectivity, but it bears fruit in the subjective realm. If there was no strength to be found there, Rand's novels would have no appeal and would have established no fan-base. Rand's so-called Objectivism has in large part only subjective influence, and that only through her novels. It is not, as I argued above, a merely aesthetic appeal, but an appeal toward that in man which endeavors to grow beyond himself into that which is not merely an empirical matter, what I called a certain potential for greatness. Man is a being that desires to expand into his environment in terms that are not numerically measurable. There is, for example, nothing empirically measurable in a Rand fan about Rand's aesthetic appeal.
I think, as you say, imagination has something to do with this, but only as an internal vehicle bringing closer to intuition that which is merely subjective, thus bringing them a semblance of concreteness. A novel is mainly a product of imagination (although it can integrate a synthesis of ideas within its form), and yet you would not denigrate Rand's novels as not counting as knowledge except in the imaginary sense.
If Rand brought a philosophy "to life" through her novels, it was with the desire that it be brought to actual life through the lives of her readers. But if your criticism were to come first, then the imaginative product would be dependent upon knowledge Rand already possessed from the world around her. And that would be entirely lacking in the visionary potential for man found in her novels, imagination would truly only be limited to Alice in Wonderland novels which integrate nothing but someone's latest drug trip.
That Rand had an idea of something greater did not come from the world around her but was a product of some vision within her which is no mere imagining. But that idea has to be something subjective before it can take imaginary form through her novels, and then objective form through the lives of her fans.
And so you see, the subjective, the ideal, the limitless, the attribute-less, comes first, or as Kant would say, a priori to the fact. Kant was however entirely lacking in the ability to entice such feelings from his readers, although there may be some subjective influence toward religious holiness through the CI. Rand had the ability to entice subjective feelings of man's potential greatness to achieve and create in the empirical realm. Religious feelings for Rand are to be directed toward some super-entity "mankind," with regard to man's conquest of nature. But that too is also subjective, as man's conquest of nature is a matter of ongoing progress - toward what end? What ultimate purpose? These are questions that do not involve empirical knowledge, but are first subjectively formulated or perhaps just imagined.
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